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BLISS v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CANADA: FROM LEGAL DEFEAT TO
POLITICAL VICTORY
By LESLIE A. PAL* AND F.L. MORTON**
This article rests on the distinction between the legal and political meanings of a
judicial decision. Cases that are resolved in legal terms may have unpredictable political
consequences Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada (1978) demonstrates thisbrilliantly:
Stella Bliss's argument that Canadian Unemployment Insurance maternity benefits
violated the equality provisions of the Bill of Rights was soundly defeated in the
court& Ultimately, however, a loose coalition of feminist and civil liberties groups
took Bliss into the politicalprocessandsucceededinforcinga revision of Unemployment
Insurance along with a dramatic expansion of the scope of section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The article traces the complex transition from
personal case to political cause, demonstrating that Supreme Court decisions have
a specious finality: disputes may only be conclusively resolved by a broader political
process wherein organizational strength, not legal princple, prevails.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Stella
Bliss's application for Unemployment Insurance benefits., The Court held
that maternity benefit provisions under the 1971 Unemployment Insurance
(UI) Act2 did not contravene the equality provisions of the Canadian Bill
of Rights.3 The denial of Unemployment Insurance benefits because of
pregnancy did not, the Court ruled, discriminate on the basis of sex or
deny women equality before the law. This decision was the end of the
road for Stella Bliss, who had spent two years fighting a denial of
Unemployment Insurance benefits. But it was just the beginning of a
series of events that would ultimately lead to a complete overhaul of
Unemployment Insurance maternity benefit conditions and to far-reaching
changes in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 The Bliss case
o Copyright, 1986, Leslie A. Pal & F.L. Morton.
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.
I Bliss v. Attorney-General of Canada (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417.
2 Unemployment Insurance Ac4 1971, R.S.C. 1971, c. 48.
3 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App. IlL
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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led women's groups to demand stronger equality rights in section 15
of the Charter, in particular the inclusion of the phrase "equal benefit"
of the law. Bliss's obscure dispute ten years ago has compelled dramatic
changes in Canada's constitutional and social policy landscape.
What is significant about Bliss is not the decision itself, but the way
that the decision has been processed within the broader political system.
To date, the Canadian literature on judicial process and policy making
has focused on the content of decisions, or the way in which legal principles
are applied to the facts of a case to produce a decision. Yet there is
a distinction, as Peter Russell notes, between the legal and political effects
of a judicial decision.5 Though Russell's analysis confined itself to the
field of intergovernmental relations, it clearly has broader application.
While Supreme Court of Canada decisions are the end of the legal process,
they are often only the beginning of a political process that amends
or overturns them. The Bliss case demonstrates this brilliantly: Bliss's
1978 legal defeat was completely neutralized through spectacular victories
in the political arena by groups that took up her cause. Bliss really has
three aspects: the legal battle, the pressure to change Unemployment
Insurance, and ultimately the fight to entrench stronger guarantees of
social equality in the Constitution.6
A close examination of Bliss also helps overcome another weakness
in the Canadian literature on judicial process: the absence of analyses
of the political and social context of judicial decisions.7 An adequate
explanation of the political meaning of a court decision requires more
than a description of legal principles and their application to a case,
or even those aspects of the socio-economic background of judges that
lead them to make certain kinds of decisions. Why do cases come forward
at all? Who champions them? What social forces do they reflect and
animate?
This study of Bliss addresses these larger dimensions of the judicial
process. It places the legal dispute into its personal, social, and political
contexts, and shows how the Court decision fit into a broader political
process that ultimately went well beyond what either Bliss or the judges
could have intended or even imagined.
5 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of
Legal Resources" (1985) XI:2 Can. Pub. Pol'y 161.
6 Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
7 C. Barr, "Using Process Theory to Explain Judicial Decision Making". I Can. J. Law &
Soc. (1986) 57.
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II. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE8
Stella Bliss was born and educated in Britain. She lived in Canada
from 1965 to 1969, working in Vancouver, and then returned to England
where she was employed as an office manager. In 1975 she decided
to return to Vancouver to start an antique business. Bliss planned to
enter Canada through New Orleans, the home of her American common
law spouse. Although they had been assured in Britain that their application
was approved, officials in New Orleans had no record of the couple.
The delays lasted weeks, and Bliss finally received her immigration papers
in June, in part on the strength of ajob offer from the Vancouver company
that had employed her earlier. Her companion was granted a three-month
work permit. Because of the delays, the job she had been promised fell
through. Concerned that her common law spouse would be deported
after his work permit expired, Bliss married him in August, 1975, un-
aware that she was two months pregnant at this time.
Thus, by summer's end, Bliss and her husband found themselves
in Vancouver without work, and because of the recession, without
prospects of starting a business. Bliss joined Brown Bros. Ford on
September 24, 1975 as a leasing secretary, and discovered shortly
afterwards that she was pregnant. Since she did not intend to request
more than one week's leave of absence, she did not inform her employer.
However, when her condition was discovered in January, Bliss was fired.
Bliss applied for Unemployment Insurance benefits in February, 1976,
but was denied. She then appealed her dismissal to the B.C. Human
Rights Commission, and was reinstated since pregnancy was an illegal
ground for firing. She worked until March 12, when she was fired again.
Bliss had a son on March 16 and reapplied for regular Unemployment
Insurance benefits on March 22. While the Commission agreed that she
was capable of and available for work, it treated her claim as one for
maternity benefits. On April 5 the Commission again denied the claim
because Bliss failed to meet the 'magic ten' requirement, which stipulated
that a woman had to have been working before she became pregnant.9
8 The following is based on interviews with Stella Bliss, her lawyers Allan MacLean and
Lynn Smith, newspaper reports, Supreme Court depositions, and material from MacLean's case
file. The interviews were conducted in Vancouver and Victoria, B.C., in July, 1985.
9 Section 30(1), UI Act, supra, note 2. This and other technical features of Unemployment
Insurance maternity benefits are explained in text accompanying note 40, infra. Bliss was actually
informed of the denial on March 31, 1976, but the April 5 letter confused the issue by erroneously
stating that she had twenty-eight weeks of insured employment in the 'magic ten' benefit period.
Bliss was informed of the error in an interview on June 11, 1976. Submission to Board of Referees,
June 15, 1976.
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Bliss appealed this decision to the Board of Referees (the first tier
of the Unemployment Insurance appeal system). She argued that her
claim was for regular rather than maternity benefits, and that if section
46 of the Act denied her these regular benefits, 10 it violated the Bill of
Rights guarantee of "equality before the law."" As well, Bliss had
consistently maintained that she was not responsible for her unemployment
before September, 1975. She blamed immigration officials for having
delayed her entry into Canada, and thus costing her the original job
offer from the Vancouver company.12 In a unanimous decision in July,
1976, the Board of Referees denied her appeal. Bliss had anticipated
a denial: "All is as expected," she wrote upon hearing of the decision. 3
The Bill of Rights argument was largely Bliss's own invention (it
had been suggested by a law student at a legal aid centre Bliss visited),
but to appeal further she needed legal and organizational help. At that
time appeals to the Umpire from a unanimous Board decision could
only be filed by an appellant's trade union or association, or with the
consent of the Chair of the Board. The Chair initially denied Bliss's
appeal to the Umpire on the ground that "there was no principle of
importance involved in the case."'14 The Service, Office, & Retail Workers
Union of Canada (SORWUC) then agreed to sponsor her case, enabling
the appeal to proceed. (Bliss only joined the union after it agreed to
be her sponsor.) Unable to afford a lawyer, Bliss was directed to Allan
MacLean of the Vancouver Community Legal Assistance Society. Mac-
Lean met with Bliss in July and was initially reluctant to accept her
case: the courts had not been receptive to equality arguments under the
BillofRights, and his time was already overbooked. Bliss persisted however,
and eventually persuaded MacLean to submit an appeal on her behalf. 5
SORWUC forwarded its submission on November 30, 1976. It argued
that the maternity benefits section of the ufAct was discriminatory because
10 Under UI Act, ibid s. 46, a pregnant claimant can receive benefits only under s. 30.
1 Section 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, note 3, reads:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue
to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex,
the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, ... (b) the right of the
individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;
12 Letter from S. Bliss to Unemployment Insurance Commission (I 1 January 1976), Vancouver.
Also see letter from S. Bliss to A. MacLean (3 December 1976), Vancouver.
13 Letter from S. Bliss to J. Rands (24 June 1976), Vancouver.
14 Letter from Unemployment Insurance Commission to S. Bliss (28 July 1976), Vancouver.
15 Letter from A. MacLean to Unemployment Insurance Commission (28 August 1976),
Vancouver. SORWUC had officially decided to support Bliss at its 22 July meeting. Service, Office
and Retail Workers Union of Canada, Local 1, Minutes of 22 July 1976.
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it "discriminates between pregnant working women and all other working
women, and... against all women by creating a special section of the
Act which ignores the biological role of childbearing which is as much
a part of any woman's life as is working itself."16
By this time the appeal had acquired some notoriety in Vancouver.
The Vancouver Province carried news reports and editorials on the issue,
and five days prior to the Umpire's hearing, SORWUC announced that
if the decision rendered was unfavourable, it would be challenged.17 The
union also promised to lobby Parliament to have the legislation changed.
Justice Collier sat as Umpire and on February 18 decided in favour
of Bliss. His examination of the UI Act suggested that its availability
provisions were "the source of a basic concept in the legislation: provided
a claimant is capable of and available for work, entitlement is the rule."' 8
In his view, section 46 was a departure from the general statutory scheme
because denial of benefits was predicated on sexual differences.
When the Commission decided to appeal the Umpire's ruling,
MacLean enlisted the help of Lynn Smith, Chair of the Vancouver
Community Legal Assistance Society and a prominent feminist lawyer.
The Federal Court of Appeal heard the case in Vancouver, and in June,
1977 decided that section 46 of the U! Act did not violate the right
to "equality before the law." Justice Pratte, in delivering the Court's
judgment, noted that the Bill of Rights did not expressly prohibit dis-
crimination, but rather granted "equality before the law" irrespective
of race, national origin, colour, religion, or sex. He further ruled:
Assuming the respondent to have been "discriminated against", it would not have
been by reason of her sex. Section 46 applies to pregnant women, it has no application
to women who are not pregnant, and it has no application, of course, to men.
If s. 46 treats unemployed pregnant women differently from other unemployed
persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are pregnant
and not because they are women.1
9
"Equality before the law" did not mean that all statutes need apply to
all individuals in the same manner, only that different treatment be based
on relevant distinctions and that individuals within distinct classes be
treated similarly.
The Court's decision was, of course, disappointing to MacLean and
Smith and to Vancouver women's groups. Representatives of the Van-
couver Status of Women had attended the hearing on May 19, as had
16 Letter from P. Barter (SORWUC) to A. MacLean (30 November 1976), Vancouver.
17 "UIC Faces Maternity Challenge", The [Vancouver] Province (5 January 1977) 23.
18 CUB-4510 at 17.
19 Re Attorney General of Canada and Bliss (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 609 at 613 (F.C.A.).
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members of Bliss's union, SORWUC. Interestingly, by this point, Bliss
had become less involved with the case. She almost missed the Federal
Court of Appeal hearing, and claims not to have shared what she perceived
as the hard-line feminism of her supporters. The case had also taken
a personal toll: her marriage had dissolved under the stress of the appeal,
and her husband and son eventually left for the United States. While
she continued to be advised by MacLean on developments and remained
convinced of the justice of her case, Bliss felt that she had become more
a symbol than an actor.20
MacLean and Bliss decided to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada, but estimated that this would cost at least $2,500.
With Bliss's permission, MacLean enlisted the Vancouver Status of
Women in establishing a Stella Bliss Appeal Fund. The Fund was quickly
endorsed by SORWUC, the British Columbia Federation of Women, and
the B.C. Government Employees' Union. The National Action Committee
on the Status of Women, based in Ottawa, also took an interest in the
case, and groups across the country held functions to raise money for
the Fund.21
MacLean served notice of appeal on August 10, 1977. The Federal
Court of Appeal heard the application in September, and granted leave
to appeal. Lynn Smith had contacted Andrew Roman of the Public Interest
Advocacy Centre requesting funds in support of the appeal. The Centre,
through Roman's personal contacts, had become a nodal point for a
loose national network of political activist lawyers interested in what
they deemed to be progressive causes. Roman was unable to provide
funding but offered to act as agent in Ottawa and to provide counsel.
He suggested John Nelligan, Q.C., a recent past-President of the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association, who agreed to serve on a pro bono basis. 22
Cost was an important consideration because, even by November, the
Vancouver Status of Women had collected under $400. The Vancouver
group had notified others across Canada, so that Quebec, Ottawa, and
Manitoba women's organizations were sending money.23 With the help
20 For example, once the Supreme Court appeal was underway, MacLean wrote to Bliss:
I am also assuming that you have no objections to the use of your name in such things
as interviews, newspaper stories, letters, etc. in an attempt to raise funds to cover disbursements
in this matter. Please let me know if you do have any objections. Keep up the good work.
(7 October 1977), Vancouver.
21 For example, the Ottawa Coalition for Full Employment contacted MacLean on 1 September
1977 to say it wanted to help raise funds for Bliss.
22 Letter from A. Roman to L. Smith (28 September 1977), Ottawa.
23 Letter from Vancouver Status of Women to A. MacLean (22 November 1977), Vancouver.
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of SORWUC and the B.C. Federation of Labour, the Fund started to re-
ceive more money from union locals early in 1978.24
With these funds, MacLean and Smith were able to travel to Ottawa
to 'junior' Nelligan, who argued before the Supreme Court. Because Chief
Justice Laskin was ill, Justice Spence was removed from the bench for
the appeal. This was unfortunate for the appellants, as these two Justices
were more favourably disposed to Bill of Rights arguments than their
colleagues. 25 While Nelligan argued the case ably, both MacLean and
Smith sensed that the Court would not be persuaded. MacLean later
concluded that the judges feared that a favourable decision on Bliss would
encourage a rash of equality-based litigation.26
The Supreme Court announced its decision on October 31, 1978.
Justice Ritchie, writing for an unanimous court, supported the lower court's
definition of "equality before the law" as "equality of treatment in the
administration and enforcement of law. . ."27 This largely procedural
definition meant that as long as Bliss was treated like all other pregnant
Unemployment Insurance claimants, the Bill of Rights had not been
violated.
Of course, Bliss had never claimed that the problem lay in the way
that section 46 had been administered. Rather, she contended that it
was section 46 itself that violated her right to "equality before the law,"
because of its harsher treatment of pregnant applicants in particular,
and, by extension, of women in general. While the procedural definition
adopted by the Court avoided this issue, Ritchie J. went on to address
it. He noted that the classification scheme represented by sections 30
and 46 was in pursuit of a "valid federal purpose," that of distinguishing
between eligible and ineligible applicants for Unemployment Insurance
benefits.28 While he conceded that section 46 had an unequal impact
on women and men, he said that this was due to "nature," not the
legislation.29
Justice Ritchie attempted to distinguish Bliss from R v. Drybones,30
in which the Court struck down a statute for apparently substantive
24 Letter from Vancouver Status of Women to A. MacLean (22 March 1978), Vancouver.
25 Letter from A. MacLean to S. Bliss (20 June 1978), Vancouver. See W.S. Tarnopolsky,
"The Supreme Court and the Canadian Bill of Rights" (1975) 53 Can. B. Rev. 649 for the pre-
Bliss record of the Supreme Court.
26 MacLean, personal memorandum on Supreme Court procedure, 12 June 1978, at 2.
27 Bliss, supra, note I at S.C.R. 192, D.L.R. 423.
28 Ibid at S.C.R. 186, D.L.R. 418-19.
29 Ibid at S.C.R. 190, D.L.R. 422.
30 R, v. Drybones (1969), [1970] S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473.
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equality reasons (racial discrimination) rather than procedural reasons.
He held that the "equality before the law" requirement was concerned
primarily, if not exclusively, with the imposition of penalties and sanctions,
and not the distribution of benefits in social welfare legislation. Ritchie
J. emphasized the "wide difference between legislation which treats one
section of the population more harshly than all others by reason of race
as in the case of Regina v. Drybones... and legislation providing addi-
tional benefits to one class of women, specifying the conditions which
entitle a claimant to such benefits."3'
Personally, Bliss was exhausted: her marriage had collapsed, and
she was tired of her notoriety in Vancouver. In addition, her case had
encouraged women having similar problems with the Commission to
appeal, and much of Bliss's time in the previous year had been spent
providing help and advice. She only occasionally responded to journalists
researching the maternity benefits question, and eventually left the country
temporarily.32 MacLean continued to work at the Vancouver Community
Legal Assistance Society, and wrote several letters over the next two
years to the Ministers of Employment and Immigration and opposition
critics, suggesting changes in Unemployment Insurance benefits. In
personal terms, however, the Stella Bliss maternity appeal was over: its
protagonists had retired from the field.
The Bliss case set other, larger, forces in motion; forces that would
eventually triumph in the political arena. While the Supreme Court of
Canada may have been concerned with the political implications of a
decision favouring Bliss, it failed to gauge the outcry that followed its
denial of the appeal. Bliss was now a national symbol for the women's
movement and, to a lesser extent, the trade union movement. The
Vancouver Status of Women described the Supreme Court's decision
as a "kick in the stomach" for all working women.33 Reacting to this
and similar criticism, Bud Cullen, Minister of Employment and Immi-
gration, issued a statement after the decision announcing that maternity
benefit provisions were under review.34 Women's groups were stunned
by what they perceived as a highly unfair legal decision, and were
determined that it would never happen again.
31 Bliss, supra, note 1 at S.C.R. 191, D.L.R. 423.
32 Bliss is currently a partner in a consulting firm, in addition to managing several business
enterprises of her own.
33 "Cabinet to re-examine UIC maternity benefits", The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 November
1978) 14.
34 Ibid
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III. MATERNITY BENEFITS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE
Preliminary analysis of the case tends to point to a "Pyrrhic victory" for the
Commission.... In other words, while it is not likely that the section will be
struck down, it is possible that the Court will seek to exert some pressure on
the Commission to render the section more equitable. In this vein it can be assumed
that the political ramifications of the court decision will be operationally more
important than the decision itself.
35
Bliss's larger ramifications can only be understood with reference
to the traditional place of maternity benefits within the Unemployment
Insurance Act. Canada's first UI Act was passed in 1940, with subsequent
Acts in 1955 and 1971.36 However, the central principles have remained
consistent despite substantial legislative change. Unemployment Insurance
operates as a social insurance scheme in which a large group of persons
is compelled to contribute to a fund from which they may subsequently
draw if they incur stipulated risks. In Unemployment Insurance, the risk
is loss of income due to involuntary unemployment. While specific
definitions have changed from statute to statute, Canadian Unemployment
Insurance has always demanded the following of potential claimants:
(i) some minimum level of contributions based on wages or salaries from
lawful employment, (ii) evidence that loss of income is in large degree
involuntary, (iii) that the claimant is capable of work, and (iv) that the
claimant is available for work. These provisions ensure that the claimant
has been in the labour force, has an insurable risk, and is involuntarily
unemployed.
Before 1971, unemployment due to pregnancy was not indemnified
under Unemployment Insurance. Unemployment due to pregnancy was
treated as voluntary, as the predictable consequence of presumably
voluntary sexual activity. As well, pregnant women leaving employment
did so because of physical incapacity to work and because of impending
child-care responsibilities: the requirements of capability and availability
were therefore violated. There were no explicit clauses under the 1955
UI Act denying benefits to pregnant or recently pregnant claimants, but
a rule of thumb developed that women were considered incapable of
and unavailable for work six weeks before and after confinement. A
35 InternalReport of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, BenefitPolicyBranch:
Discussion Paper Concerning the Aftermath of the Supreme Court Decision (1978) at 10-11.
36 Unemployment Insurance Ac4 1940, S.C. 1940, c. 44; Unemployment Insurance Act, S.C.
1955, c. 50; supra, note 2. A legislative history is available in G. Dingledine, A Chronology of
Responsa The Evolution of Unemployment Insurance from 1940 to 1980 (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1981).
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1958 Umpire decision stated: "my predecessors established the principle
that every claimant is presumed not to be able to work nor available
for work during the six weeks preceding the confinement and for the
six following weeks and also that the request of proof for rebutting such
presumption must be strong and convincing." 37 The decision also held:
First, even if there is no more presumption of non-availability when the six weeks
subsequent to the confinement have elapsed, the claimant is obviously compelled,
as any other claimant, to prove her availability for work. However, as the progressive
domestic responsibilities of the claimant may from now on prevent her from working
outside her home, the insurance officer is quite in order to request that the claimant
inform him of the steps taken or about to be taken, among other things, to insure
without delay the care of her child or children and so remain in a position to
accept at once all suitable employment opportunities.... This is a question of
fact.38
In 1962, the Committee of Inquiry into Unemployment Insurance
(the Gill Committee) noted that exceptions to the rule of thumb were
rare and, as the Umpire's decision suggests, proving availability even
six weeks after confinement required evidence of child care arrangements.
Nonetheless, the Gill Committee recommended increasing the disqual-
ification from six to eight weeks on both sides of the confinement date:
"Regulations of this type would not be intended to discriminate against
pregnant women or the mothers of young children but they would be
intended to preserve the insurance character of the unemployment
insurance plan by preventing payment of benefit to persons who are
in fact unavailable for employment."39
The 1971 U1 Act completely overhauled the plan, generally liber-
alizing its provisions and extending its benefits.40 Along with regular
benefits, the new Act introduced "special benefits" for sickness and
maternity. Only "major attached" claimants, those with at least twenty
weeks of insurable employment in the previous fifty-two, were eligible;
"minor attached" workers, with between eight and twenty weeks of
insurable employment, might be more tempted to abuse these benefits.
The outstanding feature of the new maternity benefits offered under section
30 of the Act was that the recipient did not have to demonstrate capability
and availability. Indeed, the payments were made precisely because the
claimant was presumed unavailable for work.
37 CUB-1505 at 3.
38 Ibid at 3-4.
39 Canada, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1962) (Chair. E.C. Gill) at 135. It should be noted that the Report did not object
to maternity benefits per se, only to their inclusion in Unemployment Insurance.
40 See L.A. Pal, "Revision and Retreat: Canadian Unemployment Insurance, 1971-1981" in
J.S. Ismael, ed., Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1985) 75.
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This anomaly was accepted because the federal government had
promised, but until 1970 had failed to produce, significant social policy
reforms. 41 The revisions to the Ui Act became a vehicle for 'filling the
gaps' in the Canadian welfare state. Maternity benefits, a routine feature
of most comparable social security systems was one of the gaps. Because
of the relative generosity of these benefits and a fear that they might
be abused, the Act made their qualifying conditions more stringent. In
addition to having at least twenty weeks of insurable employment in
the last year, a pregnant woman had to meet the so-called 'magic ten'
rule. Section 30(1) required a claimant to work "ten or more weeks
of insurable employment in the twenty weeks that immediately precede
the thirtieth week before her expected date of confinement." Since a
normal pregnancy is forty weeks long, this rule ensured that claimants
were employed at or before the time of conception and had not entered
the work force while pregnant simply to collect the benefits. As well,
since these were special benefits reserved for claimants who could meet
the special requirements, it seemed illogical to permit women to collect
regular benefits (for which capability and availability had to be proved)
around the date of confinement. Therefore, section 46 of the Act stated
that, subject to section 30, claimants who did not qualify for maternity
benefits were not entitled to receive regular benefits for a period
commencing eight weeks before the week of confinement and ending
six weeks after that week.
In spite of what may have been generous motives, legislators placed
a ticking bomb inside the ui Act, and it exploded with the Bliss case.
Inevitably, someone would challenge one of the Acts anomalies. First,
maternity benefits with the 'magic ten' rule had the most difficult entrance
requirement of any Unemployment Insurance benefit. Only women faced
this higher hurdle. Second, section 46 turned what had been a rebuttable
presumption under the 1955 program to an irrebuttable one. Women
who were pregnant or who had recently given birth, were denied benefits
that they would normally have had no trouble getting, simply because
their unemployment happened to coincide with pregnancy. No factual
demonstration of capability and availability had force with respect to
section 46. Finally, pregnant "major attached" claimants without the
'magic ten' qualified for neither maternity nor regular benefits. The
government had an opportunity to address these anomalies in 1975,
International Women's Year, but it chose to make only a cosmetic change
41 G.A.F. Johnson, "A Minister as an Agent of Policy Change: The Case of Unemployment
Insurance in the Seventies" (1981) 24 Can. Pub. Admin. 612 at 619.
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to increase the flexibility of the fifteen week benefit period.42 Bliss
addressed all three of these central anomalies directly, but they were
upheld.
Despite the Blissruling, complaints about discrimination under section
46 continued to be heard, now before the recently created Canadian
Human Rights Commission. Between March, 1978 and February, 1979,
the Human Rights Commission submitted six complaints on maternity
provisions to Unemployment Insurance authorities. 43 These were not
unexpected, since the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commis-
sion had been advised in early 1978 that a Supreme Court decision
upholding section 46 would intensify pressure from women's lobbies to
change the legislation. 44 In fact, women's groups across the country reacted
strongly against the Supreme Court's decision, and by 1979 the Com-
mission was promising revisions to the Act, which would make maternity
benefits more flexible. These changes were postponed with the 1980
federal election, and upon re-election the Liberals decided to establish
a Task Force on Unemployment Insurance rather than move directly
to revision.
The Task Force's 1981 Report supported the criticisms of maternity
benefits that had been made over the last few years. It suggested the
elimination of the 'magic ten' rule and section 46, and the extension
of maternity benefits to adoptive parents.45 Although the Task Force
made numerous other suggestions, only the ones relating to maternity
benefits were successfully implemented.46 The Unemployment Insurance
benefits denied to Bliss seven years earlier were now available to all
Canadian women.
IV. THE IMPACT OF BLISS ON THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
One of the minor consolations in this business is even the ones you lose sometimes
refuse to die and have their effect for future litigants even though your client
goes away dissatisfied. In my conversations with Doris Anderson, one time President
of the Women's Advisory Council, I was convinced that part of their fervour in
obtaining a special place for women's rights arose out of the shock they received
on reading the Bliss case.47
42 U! Act, supra, note 2, as am. S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 80.
43 Dingledine, supra, note 36 at 95.
44 F.L. Morton & L.A. Pal, "The Impact of the Charter of Rights on Public Administration"
(1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin. 221 at 226.
45 Employment and Immigration Canada, UnemploymentInsurance in the 1980s (Ottawa: Supply
& Services, 1981) at 67-71.
46 UIAct, supra, note 2, as am. S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 150, s. 4.
47 Letter from J. Nelligan to A. MacLean (2 June 1981), Ottawa.
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The third dimension of the Bliss saga is its impact on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court's 1978 decision
culminated a judicial trend toward a minimalist interpretation of the Bill
of Rights in general and the "equality before the law" provision in
particularn48 Bliss was the second Supreme Court decision to give a purely
procedural interpretation to the equality clause and to reject claims by
female plaintiffs that they were victims of illegal sex discrimination49
Both decisions were widely criticized by feminist and civil liberties groups.
In the aftermath of Bliss and other failed legal battles, feminist and
civil liberties groups began to argue that the existing Bill of Rights had
proven ineffective in protecting equality rights. They petitioned for a
constitutionally entrenched charter of rights with more explicit and
stronger guarantees.50 These objectives coincided fortuitously with the
nation-building agenda of then Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal
Party. With an eye toward the growing regional conflict in Canadian
politics, Trudeau embarked on a major campaign of constitutional reform
in 1980, with a new charter of rights and freedoms as its centerpiece.5 1
Feminist groups proved to be crucial allies in Trudeau's constitutional
quest. They effectively bargained their support for a rewording of the
equality rights clause that would preclude any future decisions like Bliss.
What the Canadian people got was section 15 of the Charter - the
most sweeping constitutional guarantee of equality to be found in any
liberal democracy in the world. The key clause of section 15, "the equal
benefit of the law," comes directly from Bliss.
After a summer of inconclusive negotiations culminating in the
disastrous First Ministers' Conference in September, Trudeau announced
his intention to proceed unilaterally with patriation and reform of the
Constitution.5 2 In October, 1980 the government introduced a Constitution
Act that contained a Charter of Rights applicable to both orders of
government:
48 Tarnopolsky, supra, note 25.
49 The first was Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavel; Isaac v. Bdard (1973), [1974] S.C.R.
1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481.
50 See C. Housek, "Women and the Constitutional Process" in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds.,
And No One Cheered (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 280 at 283.
51 See R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, "Nation Building and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" in Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
Constitutionalisn, Citizenship and Society in Canada (vol. 33) by A. Cairns & C. Williams (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985) 133.
52 R. Romanow, J. Whyte & H. Leeson, Canada ... Notwithstanding: The Making of the
Constitution 1976-1982 (Toronto: Carswell-Methuen, 1984) at 61.
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Section 15: Non-Discrimination Rights
(1) Everyone has the right to equality before the law and to the equal
protection of the law without discrimination because of race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, age or sex.
(2) This section does not preclude any law program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups. 53
This phrasing of "non-discrimination rights" essentially duplicated
the wording of the similar provision in section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights.
The continuity in phrasing was part of the Trudeau government's strategy
to minimize provincial opposition to the Charter by emphasizing its
continuity with existing legal precedent and policy. This strategy was
acknowledged several months later by Jean Chrdtien, who said that the
October, 1980 version "was the result of compromises achieved ... in
negotiations between the federal government and the provinces. [These
have created] the type of compromise which weakens the effectiveness
of constitutional protection of human rights and freedoms." 54
The government's 'minimalist' approach to section 15 (and to the
Charter in general) immediately antagonized interest groups who wanted
a broadly worded Charter that would effect a clean break with the 'failed'
Bill of Rights. This antagonism dominated much of the testimony given
in hearings before the Special Committee on the Constitution in November
and December of 1980. Even the past president of Canada's leading
civil libertarian association told the Special Committee that if this charter
was the best the government could offer, then his organization's response
was, "Thanks, but no thanks."55
Feminist groups quickly organized to attack the phrasing of section
15.56 In testimony given to the Special Committee on the Constitution,
the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW), the
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAG), and the
National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) all stressed the
need for "new and strong standards of equality" and for wording that
"will provide such clear directions to judges that they cannot possibly
misinterpret the intended content and meaning." 57
53 As cited by P.W. Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 52.
54 "Will make 'major changes', Chretien says in BNA statement", The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (13 January 1981) 10.
55 W. Midanik, quoted in "Canadian Civil Liberties Association News Notes on the Constitution"
(February, 1981).
56 See P. Kome, The Taking of Twenty-Eight" Women Challenge the Constitution (Toronto: The
Women's Press, 1983) at 34-37.
57 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, "Women, Human Rights and the
Constitution: Submission to the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution" (18 November 1980)
at 4.
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The representatives of these groups explicitly condemned the "equal-
ity before the law" clause as an inadequate guarantee against the repetition
of cases like LaveI158 and Bliss. In her testimony before the Special Joint
Committee, Lynn McDonald, president of the NAC, explicitly referred
to Bliss to make this point: "In view of the Stella Bliss case especially,
it is clear that more specific directions need to be given to the courts
for the interpretation of equality."59 Bliss, McDonald continued, illustrated
how "unacceptable women in the labour force are if they are pregnant
or if they have very young children." 60 She concluded by declaring that
"equality before the law is an inadequate wording, because it has been
interpreted only to mean equality in the application of the law and has
not been interpreted to mean that the laws themselves must not dis-
criminate against women." 61
The CACSW presentation to the Committee continued this theme.
Supplementary language was necessary to emphasize that what was
required was not just equal application of laws, but equal laws. To this
end, the CACSW brief recommended that the new concept of the "equal
benefit of the law" be added to section 15, and that its title be changed
from "Non-Discrimination Rights" to "Equality Rights" in order to stress
that equality meant more than non-discrimination. 62
By the end of 1980, it was clear that the government's minimalist
strategy had failed. The federal Tories and provincial 'Gang of Eight'
were still adamantly opposed to the entire package of constitutional
reform, and the government had been criticized by feminist and civil
liberties groups for proposing an anemic charter. Casting about for a
way to rescue its constitutional initiative, the Liberal government reversed
its original strategy and sought to bring on side its feminist and civil
libertarian critics. By accommodating their demands to strengthen the
wording of key Charter sections, the government hoped to gain a new
and highly visible constituency for its total reform package.
On January 12, 1981, Minister of Justice Chrdtien unveiled the
government's new strategy at the opening session of the Special Com-
mittee. Chrdtien declared that the testimony heard by the Committee
demonstrated that Canadians were not satisfied with the compromise
58 Lave!!, supra, note 49.
59 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate of the House of Commons on the Constitution
of Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, vol. 9 at 59 (20 November 1980).
60 Ibid at 64.
61 Ibid at 65.
62 The section 15 wording recommended by the CACSW brief was: "(1) Every person shall
have equal rights in law including the right to equality before the laws and to the equal protection
and benefit of the law." Supra, note 57 at 32.
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Charter language urged by the provincial premiers, and that they wanted
a "strong Charter of Rights and Freedoms." 63 He set out a sweeping
list of changes to the Charter, taking care to note the beneficiaries of
each alteration. The strategy had the intended effect. "It's incredible,"
exulted Walter Tarnopolsky, then president of the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association. "[It appears that they have given us just about exactly what
we asked for."64
No lobby fared better than the feminists. Section 15 was rewritten
almost completely in accordance with the CACSW recommendations.
Chrrtien introduced the revised section 15 with the observation that he
agreed with the CACSW and NAWL proposals to rename the section
"Equality Rights" in order to "stress [its] positive nature." He went on
to recommend that the "equality before the law" clause be reinforced
with the two additional guarantees of "equality under the law" and "equal
benefit of the law."65 The first of these was designed to protect women
"against laws that treat men and women differently, such as the Indian
Act."66 This was a clear reference to the Lavell and Bdard cases. 67 The
phrase "equal benefit of the law" was intended, among other things,
"to protect against discrimination in payment of unemployment bene-
fits... "68 The reference to the Bliss case could not have been clearer.
Subsequent legal commentary on section 15 has confirmed that the
intention behind the rewording was to reverse the restrictive interpretation
of equality given in Lavell and Bliss under the Bill of Rights.6 9
Feminists fought and won one more constitutional battle before the
Charter was adopted. On November 5, 1981, the political deadlock on
constitutional reform was broken by a compromise measure agreed to
by all parties except Quebec. One concession made by the federal
government was the addition of a "notwithstanding" clause, allowing
either level of government to exempt legislation from certain Charter
provisions, including section 15.70 Provincial leaders had demanded this
concession as a protection against 'judicial supremacy' and the centralizing
potential of the Charter.
71
63 The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, supra, note 54.
64 Ibid at 11.
65 Ibid at 10.
66 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 94(b). "More rights for women in changes to charter", The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (12 January 1981) 1.
67 Lavell, supra, note 49.
68 The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, supra, note 66.
69 See Hogg, supra, note 53 at 50-51.
70 Charter, supra, note 4, s. 33. See Kome, supra, note 56 at 83-84.
71 Knopff & Morton, supra, note 51.
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Prime Minister Trudeau publicly stated his reluctance to 'weaken'
the Charter, but argued that without this concession the Charter would
have been lost. He failed to gauge the negative reaction of feminists,
who suddenly saw their hard-fought victory on section 15 sacrificed on
the altar of federal-provincial relations. Invoking memories of Bliss,
Lavell, and other defeats, feminists quickly mounted a coast-to-coast
campaign to re-establish the 'unconditional' status of the principle of
sexual equality. Within a week, they won over the federal and all ten
provincial governments. Section 28 was added to the Charter guarantee-
ing that its rights were to be enjoyed equally by both men and women,
notwithstanding any other Charter provisions. While the practical im-
plications of this new provision are ambiguous, symbolically it was an
important assertion of the principle of sexual equality. The 'taking of
twenty-eight' represents another ripple effect of Bliss.
While the influence of Bliss on the wording of section 15 is clear,
the impact of the new right to "equal benefit of the law" on public
policy has yet to be determined. Section 15 did not take effect for three
years, to allow governments time to audit their statute books for potential
violations and correct them.72 This moratorium precluded any litigation
under section 15 until April, 1985. There has been considerable activity,
however, in the area of 'legislative audits' and these studies foreshadow
an aggressive use of the "equal benefit" wording by feminist groups.
The 'legislative audits' undertaken by provincial governments have
tended to adopt a minimalist methodology that limits the scope of equality
rights to statutes employing sex as a basis of legislative classification.
73
This approach has been sharply criticized by feminists as too narrow.
They stress that the real source of sexual inequality is now 'systemic'
rather than intentional discrimination, resulting from laws that are neutral
on their face but have a 'disparate impact' on women. Therefore, section
15, and especially the "equal benefit" language, should be interpreted
to require 'equality of result'. Feminists have undertaken their own
'legislative audit' using this result-oriented approach and have produced
a much longer and more sweeping list of required legislative reforms. 74
72 This three year waiting period is mandated by section 32(2) of the Charter, supra, note
4.
73 See Saskatchewan, Department of Justice, Compliance of Saskatchewan Laws with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Discussion Paper) released by J.G. Lane (1984);
Government of Alberta News Release, "Bill 95: The Charter Omnibus Act" (Attorney-General's
Office, 9 November 1984).
74 See Charter of Rights Educational Fund, Report on the Statute Audit Project (Toronto: 1985).
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The recently released 'legislative audit' of the federal government also
adopts a result-oriented approach to section 15, and recommends sweeping
changes in a broad range of federal programs and policies. 75
If the reforms outlined in these various 'statutory audits' are not
achieved by legislative action, feminists are prepared to try to force them
through court challenges. In October, 1984, CACSW released an extensive
study of Canadian and American interest groups' use of constitutional
litigation as a tactic to achieve policy objectives. It recommends a similar
strategy of "systematic litigation" as a "vehicle for social change." 76 An
important aspect of this plan of action, a legal defence fund to pay for
test case litigation, was launched in April, 1985. 77 In addition, the federal
government has established a five year, eleven million dollar "Court
Challenges Program," specifically designed to assist litigants mounting
section 15 challenges to government policies.78 Last but not least, feminist
lawyers will go to court well armed with sophisticated legal arguments
drawn from the impressive amount of legal periodical literature that has
been produced by lawyer-activists since 1982.79
Thus, a new chapter in Canadian constitutional development is about
to be written. Section 15 is now in effect. Wide-sweeping, egalitarian
constitutional doctrines have been finely honed by well-prepared interest
groups. Both public and private financing are in place. In the excitement
and controversy that is certain to accompany these events, the origin
of this new chapter should not be forgotten - Stella Bliss's determined
but unsuccessful battle to claim the Unemployment Insurance benefits
she thought she deserved.
75 See Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Right" Equality for All (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (Chair J.P. Boyer).
76 See M.E. Atcheson, M. Eberts & B. Symes, Women and Legal Action" Precedents, Resources
and Strategies for the Future (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1984)
esp. at 163-72.
77 Known as the Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) this organization has already
raised $250,000 from private sources and been involved in five Charter-based cases.
78 The 'new' Court Challenges Program is actually an expansion of a program established
in February, 1978 to fund language rights cases arising under ss 93 and 133 of the Constitution
Ac4 1867, supra, note 6 and the Manitoba Act, (U.K.) 13 Vict., c. 3. In 1982 the Program was
expanded to include litigation involving the language rights provisions of the Charter (supra, note
4, ss 16-23). On September 25, 1985, Minister of Justice John Crosbie announced that the Court
Challenges Program would be further expanded to include Charter litigation involving s. 15 equality
rights, and also ss 27 and 28 dealing with multiculturalism and sexual equality respectively.
Administration of the Program has been transferred from the Secretary of State's office to the
Canadian Council on Social Development to ensure independence and impartiality.
79 For the most recent and probably most influential of the s. 15 legal commentaries, see
A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985).
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V. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court decisions, aloof from the unseemly clash of vested
interests and insulated from the pressures that drive the rest of the political
process, invite exegetical analysis. Bliss, for instance, can be understood
and explained in terms of the interpretive tradition of the Supreme Court
vis-&z-vis the Bill of Rights. Allan MacLean, Stella Bliss's lawyer, correctly
anticipated the Court's negative decision. But even this type of explanation
focuses on the decision itself, ignoring its antecedents and consequences.
Our analysis of the Bliss case clearly shows that the insulation of
the judicial process is not absolute. Stella Bliss, her lawyers, and especially
her supporters from the feminist and union movements saw the court
appeals as only one stage of a broader political strategy to change
Unemployment Insurance. More fundamentally, they sought to roll back
what they perceived as widespread sexual bias in federal legislation. In
the heat of legal battle they became optimistic, and after their initial
upset in 1978, set about using other means to achieve the same end.
From the perspective of these groups, the judicial system is only one
route, one strategy, in a broader political offensive. Indeed, as Bliss shows,
legal defeat can sometimes become a political advantage. From an
exegetial point of view, the Supreme Court's decision may have had
some logical basis, but this was lost in the apparent practical absurdity
of distinguishing between "pregnant and non-pregnant persons." In this
case, precise legal language became easily and quickly transformed into
political slogans.
This transformation was not performed by Stella Bliss or her lawyers,
but by a nexus of groups prepared to support her cause. The origins
of the legal dispute were entirely personal: in the Unemployment Insurance
internal appeal system, Bliss even argued her own case. She lacked the
resources to go further, and at this point needed to couple her personal
fight with a larger political agenda. Feminist groups and trade unions
saw in Bliss a symbol and an opportunity, and came to her assistance,
thereby transforming a personal case into a political cause. In addition
to these groups, Bliss received help from a network of civil libertarian
lawyers. Singly, none of these groups and organizations was especially
powerful; together they formed a substantial support structure for an
assault on Unemployment Insurance.
Our analysis of the Bliss case compels a modest assessment of the
power of the courts. If the judicial process is indeed conceived by various
activist networks as only one strategic locus of political pressure, judicial
decisions have no intrinsic finality. A Supreme Court decision may appear
on its own merits to favour one or another side of a dispute, but the
final political resolution of that dispute depends on the determination,
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organization, resources, and wit of the combatants. The 1978 Bliss decision
could not have supported the government's arguments more firmly, but
Unemployment Insurance was under official review within days of the
decision's release, and feminist organizations turned the decision into
their trump card two years later in arguing for "equal benefit of the
law." The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms will doubtless
encourage more judicial activism but it would be a mistake to assume
that such activism will in itself create a regime of judicial supremacy
over the legislature or executive. Court decisions will continue to be
only one tributary in the broader stream of policy making.
